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I. INTRODUCTION

The National Labor Relations Act's ("NLRA") central purpose
is to reduce industrial strife and stimulate economic growth by
promoting collective bargaining between employers and unions.' The
1.
As originally enacted in 1935, the NLRA (known as the Wagner Act, after its sponsor,
Senator Robert Wagner, D-N.Y.) made it an "unfair labor practice" for an employer to "refuse to
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1947 amendments to the Act make clear that collective bargaining
must be conducted in good faith.2 Under the Act, as interpreted by
the National Labor Relations Board ("NLRB") and the courts, labor
and management must bargain collectively in good faith over the
"mandatory" subjects of "wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment." 3 From its earliest days, the NLRB has inter4
preted the duty to bargain collectively as requiring companies to
bargain collectively with the representatives of his employees." Wagner Act § 8(5), 49 Stat. 449,
452-53 (1935), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). The Taft-Hartley Act, passed in 1947,
retained this language and added the followingto bargain collectively is the performance of the mutual obligation of the employer and
the representative of the employees to meet at reasonable times and confer in good faith
with respect to wages, hours, and other terms and conditions of employment, or the
negotiation of an agreement, or any question arising thereunder... but such obligation
does not compel either party to agree to a proposal or require the making of a concession
Taft-Hartley Act § 8(d), 61 Stat. 136, 142 (1947), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). In the
"Findings and Policy" section of the 1935 Act, Congress made clear why collective bargaining
was needed: 'The denial by employers of the right of employees to organize and the refusal by
employers to accept the procedure of collective bargaining lead to strikes and other forms of
industrial strife or unrest. .. ." Wagner Act § 1, 49 Stat. at 449. Congress thought these
problems could be remedied by: "encouraging practices fundamental to the friendly adjustment
of industrial disputes arising out of differences as to wages, hours, or other working conditions,
and by restoring equality of bargaining power between employers and employees." Id.
See also NLRB v. Insurance Agents, 361 U.S. 477, 488 (1960) (noting that "[iut is apparent
from the legislative history of the whole Act that the policy of Congress is to impose a mutual
duty upon the parties to confer in good faith with a desire to reach agreement, in the belief that
such an approach from both sides of the table promotes the overall design of achieving industrial peace"); Archibald Cox and John T. Dunlop, Regulation of Collective Bargainingby the
National Labor Relations Board, 63 Harv. L. Rev. 389, 389 (1950) (stating: "The
purpose of the . . .Act was to facilitate the organization of unions and the establishment of
collective bargaining relationships); Robert Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law, Unionization
and Collective Bargaining399 (West, 1976) (arguing that "[tihe purpose of the Act is to bring to
the bargaining table parties willing to present their proposals and articulate supporting
reasons, to listen to and weigh the proposals and reasons of the other party, and to search for
some common ground. . .');
Lewis B. Kaden, The Potentialof Collective Bargainingin an Era of
Economic Restructuring, in Samuel Estreicher and Daniel G. Collins, eds., Labor Law and
Business Change 7, 21 (Quorum, 1988) (noting that collective bargaining under the NLRA
"offers the best means to promote economic growth in a complex industrial society while
ensuring fair treatment for workers and avoiding governmental control over the terms and
conditions of employment'.
2.
Taft-Hartley Act § 8(d), 61 Stat. at 142. See note 1 for the relevant text of the 1947
Act. Although Taft-Hartley made it explicit that the NLRA required "good faith," the NLRB had
implied this requirement shortly after the NLRA's passage in 1935. Aluminum Ore Co., 39
N.L.R.B. 1286, 1297 (1942).
3.
NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349 (1958); Allied
Chemical Workers v. PittsburghGlass Co., 404 U.S. 157, 164 (1971). This emphasis on "wages,
hours, and other terms and conditions of employment" derives directly from the text of the 1947
amendments. Taft-Hartley Act § 8(d), 61 Stat. at 142.
4.
Unions have also been required to disclose relevant information to employers, though
such disclosure has occured far less frequently because employers seldom have use for information possessed by unions. See generally D. Jeffrey Ireland, Note, A Union's Duty to Furnish
Information to an Employer for Purposes of Collective Bargaining, 4 U. Dayton L. Rev. 257
(1979).
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disclose some information, especially wage and unit data.5 The NLRB
and the Supreme Court have held such information presumptively
relevant to the collective bargaining process because, without it, a
union would be unable to fulfill its role as bargaining representative.6
Disclosure of financial and strategic information, such as balance sheets, income statements, tax returns, and working capital
analyses, 7 does not, however, fit neatly within the statutory obligation
to bargain collectively. Many negotiations can, and do, go on without
the union obtaining financial information.8 In many cases, however,
the union would prefer to have such information to assess its bargaining position better and determine the accuracy of employer
statements about its financial condition. The employer, for tactical
reasons, ideological bent, or fear of disclosing confidential information, may not want to release this information. 9 Unlike wage or
5.
See Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. at 1291-94, 1296-97. The NLRB held that
Aluminum Ore's failure to disclose wage rates and payroll information about the bargaining
unit, including job classification lists, was "inconsistent with the principle of collective bargaining and served to promote controversy rather than to encourage agreement." Id. at 1297. See
also The Sherwin Williams Co., 34 N.L.R.B. 651, 667 (1941) (holding that employer violated
duty to bargain collectively by failing to disclose job rates for other paint manufacturers in the

vicinity).
6.
Initially, the NLRB required unions to make a showing of relevancy and need before
requiring release of company information. Aluminum Ore Co., 39 N.L.R.B. at 1297. Over time,
the Board adopted the "presumptively relevant" standard. See Nielsen LithographingCo., 305
N.L.R.B. 697, 699 (1991) (noting that nonfinancial information is "presumed to be relevant");
Safeway Stores, Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. 1323, 1323 (1980) (quoting Westinghouse Elec. Corp., 239
N.L.R.B. 106, 107 (1978): "The union need not demonstrate that the information sought is
certainly relevant or clearly dispositive.... The appropriate standard.., is a liberal discoverytype standard" (citations omitted)); Whitin Machine Works, 108 N.L.R.B. 1537, 1541 (1954)
(Chairman Farmer, concurring) (finding union entitled to receive information without showing
its "precise relevancy").
The Supreme Court approved this standard in NLRB v. Acme
IndustrialCo., 385 U.S. 432, 435-36 (1967) (stating: "There can be no question of the general
obligation of an employer to provide information that is needed by the bargaining representative
for the proper performance of its duties").
A company may rebut this presumption by raising legitimate confidentiality concerns,
Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314-20 (1979) (finding that union's need for test
scores was outweighed by the potential harassment of the examinees), or the possibility of disclosure to competitors or third parties, Fruit & Vegetable Packers v. NLRB, 316 F.2d 389, 391
(D.C. Cir. 1963) (holding that the company met good faith disclosure obligation even though it
required the union to look at books in employer's office). Additionally, because of cost or
inconvenience, the company need not disclose the information exactly as requested, and may
request that the union bear some of the costs of disclosure. See Safeway Stores Inc., 252
N.L.R.B. at 1324 (finding that a company's "obligation is to provide the information it has
available, to compile it, or to give the Union access" to it); GeneralMotors Corp., 243 N.L.R.B.
186, 186 (1979) (expressing the expectation that if production of the information involves
"substantial costs," the parties will bargain in good faith over allocation of the costs).
7.
Other examples include management assessments of profitability, production and
sales data, product and technology information, and long-range business and competitor projections. Leslie K. Shedlin, Regulation of Disclosure, 41 Ohio St. L. J. 441, 445-46 (1980).
8.
Archibald Cox, The Duty to Bargainin Good Faith, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401, 1434 (1958).
9.
Id. at 1432-33.

1908

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1905

unit information, financial information has not been deemed by the
NLRB or courts to be presumptively relevant to unions. 1° An employer must disclose this information, therefore, only if failure to do so
would violate the Act's good faith requirement." Defining good faith,
then, is the crucial inquiry in determining the circumstances in which
12
the NLRA requires disclosure of financial information.
Since 1935,13 the NLRB, the courts, and commentators have
struggled to define the scope of the good faith requirement in the
context of the duty to disclose financial information. In 1956, NLRB
v. Truitt Mfg. Co.14 squarely presented the Supreme Court with the

issue of under what circumstances an employer must disclose f'mancial information. The Court required disclosure of the requested
information because management had claimed an inability to pay a
union wage demand. 5 The Court correctly linked the question to good
faith, 6 but did not resolve many of the fundamental issues, 7 leaving
the NLRB, the lower courts, and commentators to pick up the pieces. 8
10. Nielsen LithographingCo., 305 N.L.R.B. at 699; United Steelworkers v. NLRB, 983
F.2d 240, 243 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (finding "no presumption of relevance when a union seeks access
to financial information").
11. NLRB v. Truitt Mfg. Co., 351 U.S. 149, 152-53 (1956).
12. If financial information disclosure is mandated, an important question remains: What
information must an employer disclose? According to one commentator, the courts and NLRB
preferred a case-by-case adjudication in the 1950s because of the high value management placed
on secrecy and the real possibility that some information may be confidential. Comment,
Employers'Duty to Supply Economic Data for Collective Bargaining,57 Colum. L. Rev. 112, 121
(1957).
This observation is still essentially correct, as the Board and courts have generally given
employers leeway in both form and scope in presenting financial information. See Oil, Chemical
& Atomic Workers Local Union No. 6-148 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 360 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (holding
that furnishing data in a form that retains worker anonymity is acceptable); Metlox Mfg. Co. v.
NLRB, 378 F.2d 728, 730 (9th Cir. 1967) (finding that companies need disclose only a
"reasonable amount of explanation and elaboration"). On the other hand, some courts have
required full disclosure. See, for example, International Telephone and Telegraph Corp. v.
NLRB, 382 F.2d 366, 371 (3d Cir. 1967).
13. Although the term "good faith" was not added to the NLRA until 1947, the NLRB
implied a similar requirement in the 1935 Act and grappled with financial information disclosure almost immediately after the passage of the Act., See note 2 and PioneerPearlButton Co.,
1 N.L.R.B. 837, 842-43 (1936).
14. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
15. Id. at 152-54. The Court reasoned that "[ihf such an argument is important enough to
present in the give and take of bargaining, it is important enough to require some sort of proof
of its accuracy," id. at 152-53, and that "[glood-faith bargaining necessarily requires that claims
made by either bargainer be honest claims." Id. at 152.
16. Id. at 152.
17. Cox, 71 Harv. L. Rev. at 1432 (cited in note 8) (stating that the Court "evaded every
issue" in Truitt).
18. Financial information disclosure has generated substantial scholarship. Archibald
Cox, perhaps the leading expert on the NLRA, published the seminal article on the topic in
1958. See Cox, 71 Harv. L. Rev. 1401. He argued that broad financial information disclosure,
though essential to a mature bargaining relationship, should not be mandated by the NLRA in a
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In their most recent attempts to resolve the issue of financial
information disclosure in the cases involving the Nielsen
Lithographing Company, 19 the NLRB and Seventh Circuit Court of
2
Appeals strayed far from the statutory command of good faith. 0
Instead, they adopted the following approaches: limiting Truitt to its
facts, requiring disclosure only when a company has claimed an
inability to pay union demands; 21 asserting that the secrecy of
financial information is essential to entreprenuerial control;22 and
claiming that bargaining is, at its root, an economic battle between
sophisticated adversaries who should be permitted to fight with all
available weapons, including secrecy.2 3

For these reasons, recent

opinions have held that management must surrender financial
information only if it claims an inability to pay or, more colloquially,

per se fashion. Id. at 1430-35. Other articles addressing financial information disclosure include Russell A. Smith, The Evolution of the "Duty to Bargain" Concept in American Law, 39
Mich. L. Rev. 1065, 1094 (1941) (the earliest discussion by a scholar, arguing that financial
information should be disclosed in nearly all situations). See also, generally, Brandon David
Lawniczak, Substantiating"Competitive Disadvantage"Claims: A Broad Reading of Truitt, 87
Mich. L. Rev. 2026 (1989) (claiming that the NLRB and courts have given an unduly narrow
reading of the Supreme Court's opinion in Truitt and have therefore allowed companies to
retain undue control over the information); Christopher T. Hexter, Duty to Supply Information,
Nielsen Lithographing Co. Revisited: The Board's Retreat from Collective Bargaining as a
Rational Process Leading to Agreement, 8 Labor Law. 831 (1992) (analyzing recent Board
opinions on financial information disclosure and finding them inconsistent with the NLRA's
commitment to good faith collective bargaining); Reid Carron and Kathlyn Ernst Noecker, The
Employer's Duty to Supply Financial Information to the Union: When Has the Employer
Asserted an Inability to Pay?-or-(TheBoss Says Times are Tough: How Truitt Is), 8 Labor
Law. 815 (1992) (approving recent case law, although it is difficult to follow or predict, because
it permits employers to avoid financial information disclosure in most cases); Comment, 57
Colum. L. Rev. at 112 (cited in note 12) (finding that NLRB and court precedents went only part
of the way in developing a theory of disclosure that accomodates union management interests);
Shedlin, 41 Ohio St. L. J. at 441 (cited in note 7) (advocating broad disclosure based on
observations of labor-management cooperation in other countries).
There are also many books which give financial information disclosure a quick once-over.
See, for example, James T. O'Reilly, Unions' Rights to Company Information 50 (U. of Pa., rev.
ed. 1987).
19. Nielsen Lithographing Co. v. NLRB, 854 F.2d 1063 (7th Cir. 1988) ("Nielsen 1");
Nielsen Lithographing Co., 305 N.L.R.B. 697 (1991) ("Nielsen 11); Graphic Communications
Intern. Union,Local 508 v. NLRB, 977 F.2d 1168 (7th Cir. 1992) ("Nielsen IIr).
20. Other circuits have followed the reasoning in the Nielsen opinions. See Torrington
Extend-A-CareEmployee Ass'n v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 580, 589-90 (2d Cir. 1994); United Steelworkers
of America, Local Union 14534 v. NLRB, 983 F.2d 240, 243-45 (D.C. Cir. 1993); and United
PaperworkersIntern. Union v. NLRB, 981 F.2d 861, 865-66 (6th Cir. 1992).
21. Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1065; Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 700; Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at
1169; United Steelworkers, 983 F.2d at 243-44; and United Paperworkers,981 F.2d at 865-66.
22. Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1170; Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 702 (Member Oviatt, concur-

ring).
23.

Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1065; Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1169-71.
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pleads poverty.24 Two results follow:
first, the well-counseled
employer can avoid disclosure by speaking carefully at the bargaining
table; second, considerations of good faith, or the lack thereof, do not
affect the ultimate decision whether the employer must disclose
information.
This Note argues that the Nielsen decisions rely on a view of
bargaining inconsistent with the NLRA and do not apply proper standards of good faith. As a result, the decisions overstate the need for
secrecy of financial information. Put simply, in most cases disclosure
of financial information vindicates the goals of the NLRA by
promoting collective bargaining and bettering industrial relations.
Part Ilof this Note demonstrates that the Act, its legislative
history, and Supreme Court precedent do not support the recent
decisions, but rather envision a broader disclosure regime consonant
with the requirement of good faith bargaining. Part III closely examines the stated rationales of the Nielsen decisions, uncovers their
underlying policy goals, and discusses how they overly restrict disclosure.
Part IV argues that the Nielsen decisions have left
unsatisfactory gaps from both a labor and management perspective.
Part V suggests that the NLRB and courts should adopt a standard
that accounts for the actual good faith of the parties; the union's need
for financial information; management's legitimate interests in
control and confidentiality; and both parties' need for predictability.

II. FINANCIAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE IN PERSPECTIVE: THE

NLRA, LEGISLATIVE HISTORY, AND SUPREME COURT PRECEDENT
A. The Statute and Legislative History
The NLRA requires that employers and employees "bargain
collectively25 in "good faith" over "wages, hours, and other terms...
of employment. ' 26 For purposes of this Note, the central issue to
resolve is to what extent good faith requires disclosure of financial
information. On its face, good faith does seem to envision a process in
which both sides work to reach an agreement, but the phrase is not
self-executing on the question of whether disclosure of financial

24. Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1065; Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 700; Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at
1170; UnitedPaperworkers,981 F.2d at 865-66; United Steelworkers, 983 F.2d at 244.
25. NLRA § 8 (a)(5), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(a)(5) (1988). See generally note 1.
26. NLRA § 8(d), codified at 29 U.S.C. § 158(d) (1988). See generally note 1.
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information is required. In this regard, one must address two
fundamental issues when defining the meaning of good faith: first, to
what extent does good faith bargaining require information
disclosure; and second, whether failure to disclose should be viewed
objectively as a per se indication of bad faith or subjectively, as
evidence of a bad state of mind.
When a statute cannot be interpreted on its face, the logical
and conventional place to turn is its legislative history.2 7 Congress
enacted the basic obligation to "bargain collectively" in 1935 and
amended the NLRA to require "good faith" in 1947.28 The histories of
two Congresses, twelve years apart, are, therefore, relevant to this
inquiry.
1. The 1935 Act
Enacted in the shadows of the Depression, the NLRA dramatically altered labor-management relations. As originally introduced,
the Act did not contain a requirement that parties bargain
collectively.29 The chief Senate sponsor, Senator Wagner, believed the
requirement to be implicit in the bill's mandate that employers
recognize workers' right to organize. 30 He made his view clear in
Committee and on the Senate Floor by quoting approvingly from the
case of Houde Engineering Corp. 31 In Houde, the old NLRB had'

27. Not all agree with this statement, including Justice Scalia and Judge Easterbrook of
the Seventh Circuit, who argue that statutes alone should be the basis of judgment. See
Nicholas S. Zeppos, The Use of Authority in Statutory Interpretation:An EmpiricalAnalysis, 70
Tex. L. Rev. 1073, 1084-85 n.55 (1992). In general, the issue of how to interpret statutes has
produced a blizzard of recent scholarship on the appropriate uses of legislative materials and
changing circumstances in interpreting a statute, with much disagreement among scholars and
judges. Compare Frank H. Easterbrook, The Supreme Court, 1983 Term, Foreward: The Court
and the Economic System, 98 Harv. L. Rev. 4, 13-15 (1984) (taking a textualist view of statutory
interpretation), with William N. Eskridge Jr., Dynamic Statutory Interpretation,135 U. Pa. L.
Rev. 1479, 1554-55 (1987) (advocating a dynamic statutory interpretation).
The following discussion of the NLRA's language, passage, and subsequent history will
demonstrate that the technique favored by a particular judge is not determinative of the meaning of good faith. Whichever theory is adopted, the resulting framework should be the same,
because the statute, the legislative history, and subsequent interpretation have all been characterized by a tension between the desire for substantial bargaining and a concern that the NLRB
should not adjudicate substantive positions taken during bargaining. See notes 30-43, 84-87
and accompanying text (providing examples of and explanations for this tension).
28. See note 1 (providing the legislative history of the NLRA).
29. See Smith, 39 Mich. L. Rev. at 1084 (cited in note 18); Cox, 71 Harv. L. Rev. at 1406
(cited in note 8). Both of these articles contain outstanding research and analysis of the passage
of the NLRA. This section relies heavily on their research.
30. Smith, 39 Mich. L. Rev. at 1084-85.
31.
Cox, 71 Harv. L. Rev. at 1407 (cited in note 8). See Houde Engineering Corp., 1
N.L.R.B. (old) 35 (1934).
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interpreted the National Industrial Relations Act,32 the NLRA's
precursor, to require that employers negotiate in good faith by
accepting proposals or matching them with counter-proposals.33
Eventually, the requirement to bargain collectively was placed in the
bill.
The Senate Report explained the provision as requiring
employers to negotiate with the union in a bona fide effort to reach
34
agreement.
Fearful of NLRB overreaching, however, Senator Wagner
stated emphatically that the NLRA did not permit governmental
supervision of agreements reached through the process of collective
bargaining. 35 In fact, Senator Wagner made clear that the bill
permitted either party to withdraw if negotiations proved
unsatisfactory38 Apparently sharing the same concerns, Senator
Walsh, the Chairman of the Senate Labor Committee, stated that
once a union had been recognized, and bargaining had commenced,
the NLRB should not inquire into the substance of the negotiations37
When Senator Wagner's first statement in favor of Houde is
matched against his second statement expressing concern about government overreaching, a conflict arises in the context of financial
information disclosure. On the one hand, Senator Wagner's approval
of Houde and the idea that management should either accept a union
proposal or present one of its own implies an expansive model of
bargaining. Such a broad model would undoubtedly require financial
information disclosure. On the other hand, Senators Wagner and
Walsh made it clear that the government should allow each party
great flexibility in the bargaining room. Under this narrow view,
financial information disclosure would surely not be required. The
1935 Act and its legislative history reflect, therefore, a tension
between government supervised bargaining and private autonomy.38

32. Held unconstitutional by the Supreme Court in Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United
States, 295 U.S. 495, 537-40 (1934).
33. Houde, 1 N.L.R.B. (old) at 35.
34. Smith, 39 Mich. L. Rev. at 1085 (cited in note 18).
35. Id. at 1086.
36. Id.
37. Cox, 71 Harv.L. Rev. at 1402 (cited in note 8). Senator Wagner's statement in full
was:
When the employees have chosen their organization, when they have selected their
representatives, all the bill proposes to do is to escort them to the door of the employer
and say, "Here they are, the legal representatives of your employees." What happens
behind those doors is not inquired into, and the bill does not seek to inquire into it.
Id.
38. See id. at 1409 (describing the tension in the Act); Theodore J. St. Antoine, The
Collective BargainingProcess in Charles J. Morris, ed., American Labor Policy, A Critical
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2. The 1947 Amendments
In 1947, spurred by a sense that union power had gone too
far, 39 Congress enacted the Taft-Hartley Act. In so doing, Congress
refined the requirement to bargain collectively in response to NLRB
decisions it found improper. 40 Believing that NLRB decisions intruded on the substance of negotiations, Congress specifically relieved
employers of any duty to make or offer concessions to unions.41 At the
same time, however, Congress inserted a proviso that labor and
management must meet in "good faith" to discuss "wages, hours, and
other terms and conditions of employment. ' ' 42 These two provisions
reflect a tension similar to that found in the 1935 Act. Congress did
not want to require employers to accept certain proposals, or even to
offer proposals, yet it wanted both sides to bargain in good faith over
43
mandatory issues.
While it is tempting to try to resolve this tension, neither the
statutory language nor the legislative history will permit it. In
evaluating bargaining claims, the goal must be to preserve the tension. 44 To be true to the statute, the NLRB and the courts must devise a legal regime that does not require specific concessions or proposals, but still requires employers and employees to bargain in good
faith.
B. Supreme Court Precedent
1. NLRB v. Truitt and the Preference for Rational,
Good Faith Bargaining
In NLRB v. Truitt,45 the company claimed that it could not

afford a union wage request, yet it refused a union demand to see the
company's financial books. 46 The NLRB found, and the Supreme

Appraisal of the National Labor Relations Act 215, 217 (BNA, 1987) (discussing the disclosure
debate).
39. Gorman, Basic Text on Labor Law at 5 (cited in note 1).
40. Labor-Management Relations Act of 1947, H. Rep. No. 510, 80th Cong., 1st Sess. (June
3, 1947), reprinted in 1947 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1135, 1139.
41. 29 U.S.C. § 158(d).
42. Id.
43. St. Antoine, The Collective BargainingProcessat 217-18 (cited in note 38).
44. See Cox, 71 Harv. L. Rev. at 1416 (cited in note 8) (discussing the need to encourage
good faith bargaining).
45. 351 U.S. 149 (1956).
46. Id. at 150-51.
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Court affirmed, that the NLRA's good faith requirement mandated
disclosure of the information. 47 According to the Court, Congress
4
mandated good faith in the hope that it would lead to agreements. B
Because the union and management treated the company's ability to
pay a wage increase as relevant to the negotiations, agreement could
be reached only if all relevant information was on the table. 4 9 Also,

the Court indicated that good faith required claims of poverty to be
truthful; 50 thus, the Court held that an employer's failure to
substantiate claims justified the NLRB's finding that management
violated the statutory requirement of good faith bargaining.51
While the Court affirmed the NLRB's decision, it did not agree
with the NLRB's reasoning that an employer violated the good faith
requirement any time it failed to disclose financial information after
making an inability to pay claim.52 Instead, the Court stated that
5
every case turns on its specific facts. 3

Commentators, especially Archibald Cox, the foremost authority on U.S. labor law at Truitt's time, were dismayed by the Court's
reasoning. Cox argued that if each case really turned on its particular
facts, and good faith was viewed subjectively, then the Court should
have remanded the case to the NLRB. Since the Court did not remand Truitt, but made a decision on the merits, Cox concluded, the
Court must really have endorsed the per se objective standard
adopted by the NLRB. 54 In the almost forty years since Truitt, Cox's
reading has become standard hornbook law55 and the basis for many
decisions. 56 A per se standard should place financial information in

the same category as wage and unit data, which the union generally
may obtain.57 As the NLRB and Seventh Circuit demonstrated in

Nielsen, however, most courts are unwilling to permit disclosure of
financial information except in narrow situations.r8 Believing that
Truitt leaves them with no other alternative than a per se objective.
47. Id. at 151-54.
48. Id. at 152.
49. See id. at 152-53 (discussing the need for accurate information in the bargaining
process).
50. Idat152.
51. Id. at 152-53.
52. Id.
53. Id. at 153.
54. Cox, 71 Harv. L. Rev. at 1430-33 (cited in note 8). See also Comment, 57 Colum. L.
Rev. at 116 (cited in note 12).
55. O'Reilly, Unions' Right to Company Information at 50 (cited in note 18). See also
Lawniczak, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2044 (cited in note 18).
56. See Lawniczak, 87 Mich. L. Rev. at 2044 n.98 (listing cases).
57. See note 6.
58. See notes 19-24, 107-46 and accompanying text.
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standard, they limit Truitt to its facts and apply a per se standard
only to inability-to-pay claims. 59
Even a cursory reading of Truitt, however, demonstrates that
it cannot be easily squeezed into a per se mold. The Court's willingness to examine each case on its own facts 60 and its requirement that
companies should not be permitted to deceive unions through false
claims of poverty belies any suggestion that the Court adopted a per
se standard.61 Rather, these requirements suggest a situation-specific
inquiry into the particular information sought and the parties'
interests in it. Additionally, a sole focus on inability to pay neglects
Truitt's finding that relevance has a role to play in information
disclosure.2 Disclosure in Truitt was premised, at least partially, on
the fact that the company's ability to pay increased wages was highly
relevant to the union. 63 The Court did not limit the relevance concept
to substantiation claims, but instead acknowledged that the union's
perspective was equally important to management's in determining
64
relevance.
At times, the NLRB and many courts have recognized Truitt's
broader statements to reach results quite different than in Nielsen.
For example, the NLRB and courts have issued many opinions
requiring financial information disclosure even when the employer
made no direct claim of inability to pay. 65 Many of these cases relied
While these
on the "relevancy" standard discussed in Truitt.66
decisions have been more faithful to Truitt, they ultimately have not
become the dominant paradigm because Truitt itself, as Professor Cox
pointed out, did not put forward a coherent theory that courts can
follow. 6 7

On the other hand, several cases have denied unions access to
financial information even when an employer's statements might
generally require substantiation.68 These cases differ from the

59. See notes 107-09 and accompanying text.
60. Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152-53.
61. In Detroit Edison v. NLRB, 440 U.S. 301, 314-15 (1979), the Court explicitly stated
that it believes a subjective standard is appropriate in evaluating good faith. See notes 88-93
and accompanying text.
62. Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152.
63. Id.
64. Id.
65. See notes 134, 139, 149 and accompanying text.
66. See note 139 and accompanying text.
67. See note 54 and accompanying text.
68. See notes 69-71. The majority in Nielsen II recognized this neglected holding of Truitt,
but used it to argue that inability to pay is a necessary, but not sufficient, precursor to financial
information disclosure. This interpretation misconstrues Truitt. Instead, the Court's statement

1916

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1905

majority of substantiation cases because they involve situations in
which the union acted in bad faith,69 or the information sought was
too confidential to permit disclosure, at least in the form requested by
the union. 70 Additionally, the NLRB has held that companies need
not disclose information in the exact form or manner that the union
71
requested.
2. Truitt's Theoretical Underpinnings
Although Truitt's reasoning is ultimately unsatisfactory because of the flaws discussed by Professor Cox, the Court's opinion
offers a theoretical basis from which to form a more satisfactory
answer than that found in the Nielsen decisions. Most importantly,
Truitt definitively held that a primary purpose of the NLRA was to
foster agreements. 72 Truitt advocates the theory that informed,
73
rational bargaining will lead to better labor relations.
The Court has echoed Truitt's preference for rational bargaining in many other situations. For instance, in NLRB v. Jones &
Laughlin Steel Corporation,74 the first Supreme Court interpretation
of the NLRA, the Court stated that though no agreement could be
compelled under the Act, negotiation would promote industrial
peace. 75 In H.J. Heinz Co. v. NLRB, 76 the Court held that bargaining
is a requirement of the Act, and an employer, though he may not want
to do so, must bargain. 77 In Teamster's Union v. Oliver,78 the Court
spoke of collective bargaining in good faith as a means to preserve

was meant to allow the NLRB flexibility to handle diverse fact situations, not to preserve all
other information from disclosure. See notes 60-64 and accompanying text.
In any event, the Board, in Nielsen, held that a claim of inability to pay forces the disclosure
of information. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 701.
69. See NLRB v. AS. Abell Co., 624 F.2d 506, 511 (4th Cir. 1980) (recognizing that
'legitimate fear of harrassment" of employees who had crossed picket lines justified non-disclosure of information).
70. Detroit Edison, 440 U.S. at 317-20 (permitting company to withhold specific test information due to sensitive nature of the results and slight burden on union). See also id. at 318
n.14 (citing cases).
71. Ingalls Shipbuilding Corp., 143 N.L.R.B. 712, 718 (1963).
72. Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152.
73. In contrast, the Seventh Circuit in Nielsen III viewed negotiations as a prelude to econontic war. See notes 150-54 and accompanying text.
74. 301 U.S. 1 (1937).
75. Id. at 45.
76. 311 U.S. 514 (1941).
77. Id. at 525-26.
78. 358 U.S. 283 (1959).
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industrial peace. 9 These precedents evidence a commitment to
rational, good-faith bargaining.
3. The Role of Economic Weapons"
Concurrent with the endorsement of rational, good-faith bar81
gaining, the Court has also approved the use of economic weapons.
In NLRB v. Insurance Agents International Union,82 the Court
overturned an NLRB determination that a union had not negotiated
in good faith because it had directed its members to arrive late at
work, refuse to attend conferences, and undertake other measures
harmful to the employer. Reasoning that collective bargaining is not
an academic search for truth and that labor and management often
have antagonistic views of how to divide the economic pie, the Court
83
upheld the use of economic weapons even in the midst of bargaining.
Insurance Agents did not diminish the role of collective bargaining, however.8 4 The Court in Insurance Agents did not subordinate good faith bargaining, but rather made sure that the NLRB did
not subordinate the legitimate use of economic weapons. 85 Instead,
the Court stated that the requirement of good faith and the use of
economic weapons existed side by side. 86 Thus, InsuranceAgents does
not depart from Truitt; rather, it recognizes the tension inherent in
87
the Act.

79. Id. at 295-96.
80. Examples of economic weapons from the union side are strikes, slowdowns, and
pickets. From the management side, examples are lock-outs and permanent replacements. See
generally Charles J. Morris, ed., 2 The DevelopingLabor Law 995-1282 (BNA, 2d ed. 1983).
81. NLRB v. InsuranceAgents International Union, 361 U.S. 477, 489 (1960).
82. 361 U.S. 477.
83. Id. at 488-89.
84. The Seventh Circuit seems to have adopted the view that economic weapons are more
important than collective bargaining. Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1171 (stating that information
need not be disclosed because the union can either "knuckle under to the company's demands or
call a strike").
85. In Insurance Agents, the Court stated that notwithstanding the existence of economic
weapons, good faith bargaining imposed upon parties a duty to make a "serious attempt to
resolve differences." 361 U.S. at 486.
86. Id. at 489-91,494-95.
87. See notes 30-43 and accompanying text.

1918

VANDERBILT LAW REVIEW

[Vol. 47:1905

4. DetroitEdison: Confirming the Preference for
Good Faith Bargaining
In Detroit Edison Co. v. NLRB,8 the Court confronted an employer that withheld employee testing information from the union.
Detroit Edison sought to be excused from disclosure of this nonfinancial information because of concern that leaks by the union could
compromise future testing and violate privacy interests of those who
took the test.89 The Court refused to require disclosure, 90 and in so
doing affirmed a flexible view of good faith consistent with Truitt.
While acknowledging the general principle that unions are entitled to
relevant information,9 1 the Court cautioned the NLRB against rules
that fail to account for confidentiality and legitimate business concerns.92 The Court found the ultimate touchstone to be subjective
good faith; because the company's actions were in good faith, the
93
NLRA did not require disclosure.
In summary, the NLRA and Supreme Court precedent indicate
that courts should evaluate bargaining positions under the rubric of
good faith. While economic weapons are legitimate, once in the
bargaining room, management and labor are expected to search for
agreement. Unfortunately, as discussed below, the Seventh Circuit,
and the NLRB to a lesser extent, have abandoned this reading of the
statute.
III. THE NIELSEN DECISIONS
A. Facts and Holdings

In June 1983, the Graphic Communications International
Union, Local 508, and Nielsen Lithographing Company began negotiating a new contract. 94 The union had represented workers at the
plant for forty years.95 Nielsen asked for wage and benefit reductions,
despite claiming profitability, because its labor costs exceeded those of

8.
89.
90.
91.
92.
93.
94.
95.

440 U.S. 301 (1978).
Id. at 313, 317.
Id. at 319-20.
As did Truitt. See notes 49, 62-64 and accompanying text.
DetroitEdison, 440 U.S. at 314, 319.
Id. at 320.
Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 697.
Id.
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other printers.9
Without these concessions, the company claimed
97
that future business losses would result in a reduction of union jobs.

The union asked the company to substantiate these claims with
financial information, but the company denied the request. 98 The
union struck, and the company permanently replaced the workers. 99
The union filed a charge with the NLRB, claiming that Nielsen's
nondisclosure was an unfair labor practice in violation of the NLRA's
good faith bargaining requirement. 00 The company would have had to
reinstate the workers if the union proved its case. 1 1
Labor and management then engaged in a six-year litigation
marathon. The administrative law judge ("AL') who first heard the
case ruled that the employer had a duty to release the financial information requested by the union. 0 2 The NLRB subsequently adopted
the AU's judgment without writing its own opinion. 0 3 The Seventh
Circuit refused to enforce the NLRB's order and stated that the NLRA
did not impose a duty to release the financial information. 0 4 On
remand, the NLRB reversed its earlier decision and adopted the
Seventh Circuit's view. 10 5 The Seventh Circuit subsequently affirmed
06
this decision.'

96.
97.
98.

Id.
Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1065.
Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 697. The information requested included:
1. Documents by the Employer to banks for the purpose of obtaining loans,
including projected balance sheets and income statements.
2. Financial statement for three years prior, as well as tax returns and current
financial statements.
3. Analyses of working capital for the last three years.
4. Charts of all supervisory employees and total compensation.
5. Expense reports submitted by management personnel and owners.
6. List of automobiles leased or owned by the company.
7. List of how many ofthe non-union employees have been laid off and how long,
please list.
Id. at 698.
99. Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1169.
100. Id. See note 1 and accompanying text for the language of the NLRA.
101. NLRB v. Mackay Radio & Telegraph Co., 304 U.S. 333, 345-346 (1938).
102. Nielsen LithographingCo. and Graphic Communications InternationalUnion, Local
508, 279 N.L.R.B. 877, 877 (1986). Because this opinion simply affirmed the A.'s determination, and was subsequently overturned by the NLRB, it is not relevant to the NLRB's current
position on the subject. It is, therefore, beyond the scope of this Note.
103. Id.
104. Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1067.
105. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 701.
106. Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1171. Because the two Seventh Circuit opinions were written
by Judge Richard Posner, and advocate different aspects of the same position, this Note treats
them as one. See Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1064; Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1168.
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B. The Nielsen Tests
1. The Substantiation Test
As interpreted in the Nielsen cases, good faith bargaining requires the disclosure of financial information by the employer only if
17
the employer pleads poverty to a given wage or benefit demand.
When the union requests substantiation of poverty claims, management must provide the information. 108 Both the Seventh Circuit and
the NLRB relied on the narrowest reading of Truitt for this proposition.109 Truitt requires companies to substantiate claims of poverty
with financial information,"0 but, as discussed above,," Truitt did not
limit the possibility of disclosure to a poverty situation.
The Seventh Circuit offered two reasons why Nielsen's statements about its business problems did not constitute an inability to
pay. First, the court laid heavy emphasis on Nielsen's contention that
it was profitable and could afford to pay the wages requested by the
union."2 For the Seventh Circuit, these statements amounted to a
position by Nielsen that although it could, it simply would not meet
the union's demand."1 According to the court, Nielsen's statement
that its wages were not competitive with other companies did not
constitute an inability-to-pay claim requiring substantiation because
wages and labor costs, in general, are not the only factors in business
competition."1 Other advantages, such as greater efficiency, better
technology, or an expanding market, may permit a company with
noncompetitive wages to remain profitable." 5 From the Seventh
Circuit's perspective, the company's statements about stiff

107. Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1065; Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 699-700; Nielsen III, 977 F.2d
at 1170.
108. Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1065; Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 699-700; Nielsen III, 977 F.2d
at 1170.
109. Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1065; Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 699-700; Nielsen III, 977 F.2d
at 1170.
110. Truitt, 351 U.S. at 152-53. Notably, however, the Supreme Court did not adopt a per
se approach even when poverty was claimed, advocating case-by-case determinations of good
faith. Id. at 153. Although the NLRB noted this wrinkle in its opinion, Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B.
at 699, its holding would lead to disclosure of information any time a poverty claim was made.
Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 701 (stating that "financial inability to pay ... triggers a duty to
prove").
111. See notes 49, 62-64 and accompanying text.
112. Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1065.
113. Id.
114. Id.
115. Id.
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competition were evidence of a simple want for more profits.
According to the court, such a desire could not be substantiated.116
The court held that disclosure should not be required when no
117
substantiation is possible.
Second, the court grappled with the ALJ's factual finding that
Nielsen's statements amounted to a prediction that the company
would probably go out of business without concessions.118
The
Seventh Circuit held that a prediction of job losses due to competition
did not amount to a claim of inability to pay, unless the predicted
losses would occur during the term of the contract.1 9 Since these
were long-term predictions, the court reasoned that they were nothing
more than "truisms"20-a business that has higher wages vis-h-vis its
competition will not be able to withstand competition in the future.21
Because the court characterized Nielsen's statements as benign
forecasts, the court refused to require disclosure.22
The court relegated Truitt's disclosure requirement to
situations in which an employer pled poverty within the contract
term. In this situation, the Seventh Circuit reasoned, a lack of
disclosure would leave the union with a "Hobson's choice," whereby a
union would have to agree to possibly unjustified terms or risk
members' jobs by striking.123 If the employer was telling the truth,
and truly could not pay the wages, the strike would force the
employer to hire permanent replacements at lower wages to preserve
itself. 24 Requiring the union to make this choice would be, in the
court's words, "Russian roulette," and violate the good faith
bargaining requirement.25
On remand, the NLRB adopted the Seventh Circuit's view and
held that Nielsen's statements did not constitute an inability to pay. 26
Unlike the Seventh Circuit, which had found profitability to be a

116. Id.
117. Id.
118. Id.
119. Id. at 1065-66.
120. Id. at 1066 (citingNLRB v. Harvstone Corp., 785 F.2d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 1986)).
121. Id. (citingNLRB v. Harvstone Corp., 785 F.2d 570, 577 (7th Cir. 1986)).
122. Id. at 1065.
123. Id.
124. See id. (explaining that a union that could not look at the books of an employer who
was claiming that it was incapable of paying a wage increase would be faced with a "Hobson's
choice of acceding to a quite possibly exaggerated claim of poverty or risking its members' jobs
[if the company was forced to shut down or hire new workers]').
125. Id.
126. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 701.
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defense to disclosure, 127 the NLRB concluded that an employer's
statements would be examined in all situations to determine if they
8
contained an inability-to-pay claim requiring substantiation.12
Additionally, the NLRB signaled that its view of what constituted an
inability-to-pay claim was broader than' the Seventh Circuit's by stating that claims of noncompetitiveness could be considered poverty
29
pleas in certain circumstances.
In his dissent to the NLRB's decision, Chairman Stephens
accepted the inability-to-pay standard, but argued that Nielsen's
statements amounted to a plea of poverty. 30 Chairman Stephens
focused on Nielsen's statement that without reductions, high union
wages would result in a loss of competitive position and union jobs. 13
These statements amounted to, in the chairman's opinion, a claim
that Nielsen was unable to pay current wages. 132 Given these
findings, he found an obligation to disclose the information under
Truitt.33 Ironically, in cases pre-dating Nielsen, Chairman Stephens'
view had often prevailed at the NLRB and in the federal courts of
34
appeal.

127. See notes 112-17 and accompanying text. See also Clifford R. Oviatt, Jr., The Bush
NLRB in Perspective: Does the Playing FieldNeed Leveling?, 11 Hofstra Lab. L. J. 47, 56 (1993)
(former NLRB member stating that NLRB looks to the entirety of an employer's conduct when
determining whether an inability-to-pay claim was made).
128. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 701.
129. Id. at 700. The text of the NLRB decision is instructive:
We do not say that claims of economic hardship or business losses or the prospect of
layoffs can never amount to a claim of inability to pay. Depending on the particular
facts and circumstances of a particular case, the evidence may establish that the employer is asserting that the economic problems have led to an inability to pay or will do
so during the life of the contract being negotiated.
Id. This statement is far broader than the Seventh Circuit's and leaves the NLRB with substantially more room to make case-by-case judgments.
130. Id. at 703 (Chairman Stephens, dissenting).
131. Id. at 704.
132. Id. at 706-07.
133. Id. at 708.
134. See, for example, Facet Enterprises, Inc. v. NLRB, 907 F.2d 963, 980-81 (10th Cir.
1990); Pertec Computer Corp., 284 N.L.R.B. 810, 811-12 (1987); NLRB v. Palomar Corp., 465
F.2d 731, 734-35 (5th Cir. 1972); InternationalTelephone and Telegraph Corp. v. NLRB, 382
F.2d 366, 370-71 (3d Cir. 1967); NLRB v. Western Wirebound Box Co., 356 F.2d 88, 91 (9th Cir.
1966) (stating-. "We see no reason why.., an employer who insistently asserts ... competitive
disadvantage... does not have a...
duty to come foward, on request, with some substantiation").
Neither the NLRB nor the courts have been consistent in resolving these cases, however, as
they sometimes refuse to order disclosure in similar situations. See, for example, Buffalo
Concrete, 276 N.L.R.B. 839, 840-841 (1985), enforced in Washington Materials v. NLRB, 803
F.2d 1333, 1338-39 (4th Cir. 1986).
One reason why the NLRB may have rejected Chairman Stephens' view was the nature of
the union's request. Instead of requesting only financial information, the union asked for
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2. The Relevancy Standard
Although the NLRB adopted the inability-to-pay standard, its
opinion began with the statement that the important inquiry for information disclosure cases is relevancy.135 In other contexts, the
NLRB and courts have held that information related to the bargaining unit is presumptively relevant to the union as bargaining representative. 136 For financial information, however, the NLRB stated in
Nielsen I that the union bears the burden of demonstrating relevance.' 37 The NLRB then decided the case by considering only
whether management had made an inability-to-pay claim. Absent
any union showing of relevancy, the NLRB's decision gives a wellcounseled employer the power to decide, by choosing when to plead
138
poverty, what is relevant to the negotiations.
This anomalous result is inconsistent with previous decisions.
When focused on relevancy as the primary standard, courts generally
have required disclosure of financial information.13 9 This requirement
is logical because financial information is often helpful to the union in
assessing its bargaining position.140 Another strength of the relevancy
standard is that it also accounts for the union's perspective.14 '
information that was partly within management's sole prerogative. See note 98 and text
accompanying notes 201-05 (discussing the problems with aspects of the union's request).
135. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 699.
136. See note 6 and accompanying text.
137. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 699.
138. The "employer's obligation to open its books does not arise unless the employer has
predicated its bargaining stance on assertions about its inability to pay during the term of the
bargaining agreement under negotiation." Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 700 (citations omitted).
139. For examples of cases holding that financial information should be disclosed based on
a "relevancy" rationale, see NLRB v. Blevins Popcorn Co., 117 Legal Rel. Ref. Man. (BNA) 2425,
2429 (D.C. Cir. 1984); Curtiss-WrightCorp., Wright AeronauticalDivision v. NLRB, 347 F.2d 61,
69 (3d Cir. 1965); San Diego Newspaper Guild v. NLRB, 548 F.2d 863, 867-68 (9th Cir. 1977).
These courts have placed the burden on the union to demonstrate that the requested information is relevant to the issues at hand. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 347 F.2d at 69; San Diego
Newspaper Guild, 548 F.2d at 867-68.
140. NLRB Chairman Stephens, in his Nielsen 11 dissent, adopted a relevance test:
"Because the Respondent [Nielsen] specifically relied on its unsatisfactory economic condition as
a justification for its need for deep concessions, its economic condition became relevant to the
Union's decision whether or not to grant those concessions." Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 703
(Chairman Stephens, dissenting).
141. The Supreme Court has accepted this union-based perspective in a different context.
In FallRiver Dyeing & FininshingCorp. v. NLRB, 482 U.S. 27, 43-44 (1987), a plant closed and
was purchased by a former employee who reopened it seven months later. The Court, reversing
the Board, found the new owner a successor, and therefore under obligation to bargain with the
union that previously had represented the workers. Id. at 45-46, 52. The Court adopted a
worker-based perspective and placed heavy weight on the fact that the new plant did similar
work and used workers in the same manner as did the old plant. Id. at 43-44.
The union-based perspective adopted in FallRiver Dyeing indicates that the Supreme Court
might look favorably on an argument for a similar point of view in financial information disclo-
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Finally, from the union's point of view, disclosure was relevant to
avoid the "Hobson's choice" the Seventh Circuit found incompatible
with the NLRA.142
Predictably, the Seventh Circuit did not view relevancy in this
manner. Instead, the court adopted a cramped view of relevance
under which financial information is not relevant to the union unless
the employer makes an inability-to-pay claim. 143 By equating
relevancy with inability-to-pay claims, the Seventh Circuit closed off
any avenue that the union could use to obtain the information,
besides one completely controlled by the employer.'"
Because it did not categorically adopt such a standard,
however, the NLRB left itself with more room to modify its judgment
in succeeding cases than did the succeeding cases. A union with a
strong relevancy claim may be able to convince the NLRB to consider
its request in the absence of an inability-to-pay claim by the employer,
especially if the NLRB is persuaded to consider a union's
perspective. 145 Because lack of information in bargaining makes
informed bargaining difficult,146 allowing fair relevancy claims to force
disclosure is sensible. The standard adopted by the Seventh Circuit
and NLRB in Nielsen sets up management as the sole arbiter of
relevancy and leaves the union, absent management beneficence or
imprudence, groping in the dark.
3. The Discovery Standard
The Seventh Circuit also analogized the request for information to a discovery request. 147 According to the court, the union
desired financial information to prove that the company could afford
sure cases, especially given that unions must base their crucial decision to strike on their measure of employer strength.
142. Nielsen I, 854 F.2d at 1065.
143. Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1169-70.
144. See id. at 1170-71.
145. This would be consistent with the Supreme Court's Fall River Dyeing decision, in
which the Court expressly adopted an employee-based perspective. See note 141.
146. "Without the disclosure of relevant information... contract negotiations... would be
hampered. Merely meeting and conferring without a prior exchange of requested data, where
such is relevant, does not facilitate effective collective bargaining and, therefore, does not meet
the requirements" of the NLRA. Curtiss-Wright Corp., 347 F.2d at 68 (emphasis in original).
147. Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1169. The discovery analogy has been used generally in the
nonfinancial context. When used, it has led to an order that the company disclose such information. See, for example, Acme Industrial Co., 385 U.S. at 437-38 (reasoning that discovery of
information allows for early evaluation of a claim's merits); NLRB v. Pfizer, 763 F.2d 887, 889
(7th Cir. 1985) (noting that the relevance of particular information "is determined under a
'discovery-type' standard"). Notably, Judge Posner was a member of the panel that decided
Pfizer. 763 F.2d at 888.
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to retain existing wage levels. The court reasoned that the employer
admitted that it could afford to pay the request, but chose not to. This
admission, according to the court, mooted the union's request because
the employer had not made an effective plea of poverty. 148 This line of
reasoning leads once again to total employer control over information
disclosure.
The court based its analysis on an underlying assumption that
an employer either unambiguously makes an inability-to-pay claim or
it does not. Real life is far more indefinite. While not explicitly
claiming an inability to pay, Nielsen had made several statements
that could have led the union to fear job losses if it rejected the wage
decrease. From the union's perspective, therefore, the company's
statements had not mooted the information request, but rather had
prompted it. Although not noted by the Seventh Circuit, at least one
other court relied on similar reasoning to require disclosure of
149
financial information.
C. TheoreticalBases for the Nielsen Opinions
1. The Seventh Circuit
In its Nielsen opinions, the Seventh Circuit laid out a coherent
theoretical justification for its position. It stated that unions often
make information requests to harass employers.s ° According to the
court, this harassment occurs in three ways: (1) by embarrassing a
profitable employer into paying more; (2) by creating a legal issue; or
(3) by delaying the inevitable defeat, and thereby retaining benefits
for as long as possible.' 51 The court indicated that unless it limited
disclosure to the narrow case of an inability-to-pay claim, unions
would achieve their harassing goals. The Seventh Circuit was content
to leave the union in the position of having to, in Judge Posner's
colorful phrase, "knuckle under to the company's demands or call a
strike.' '1 52 The court's reasoning reveals a deep hostility to the

148. Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1170-71. In the case of a car accident, an admission by the
driver that her driving was negligent would moot that point and obviate the need for discovery.
149. See Blevins Popcorn, 117 Labor Rel. Ref. Man. (BNA) at 2429 (noting- 'The standard
[in financial information disclosure cases] is a liberal one, much akin to that applied in discovery proceedings" (quoting Local 13, Detroit Newspaper Printingand Graphic Communications
Union v. NLRB, 598 F.2d 267, 271 (D.C. Cir. 1979))).
150. Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1169-70.
151. Id. at 1170.
152. Id. at 1171.
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negotiation process and a preference for confrontation and the use of
economic weapons. 153
The court effectively ignored the NLRA's
bargaining. 154
collective
mandate to promote
The Seventh Circuit also justified its explicit adoption of an
employer-based approach'55 by claiming that to hold otherwise would
be to require management to bargain over core management
prerogatives.156 The view that management need not bargain over or
sacrifice management prerogatives is firmly entrenched in Supreme
Court and NLRB precedent. 157 Especially when the matter is only
tangentially related to collective bargaining, but at the heart of
management control of the enterprise, management need not bargain
with the union.158 While labor may not invade this realm that is
within this core area of management control, the Seventh Circuit's
assertion that financial information is generally of such importance to
management is suspect. If taken seriously, this view would lead to
complete nondisclosure, a position even the Seventh Circuit was
unwilling to adopt. A more sensible stance is that certain requests
should be denied on the basis of true management prerogatives, while
other requests should not be construed to cut as deeply. This Note,
Part V, suggests a way that courts can consider management
prerogatives without eliminating almost all disclosure.r 9
Additionally, the Seventh Circuit and Member Oviatt, who
concurred in the NLRB's decision, believed that a broad disclosure
requirement would lead to codetermination. 16 0 They relied upon First

153. For examples of economic weapons, see note 80.
154. See note 1 and accompanying text.
155. See notes 143-44 and accompanying text.
156. Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1170.
157. The classic formulation is Justice Stewart's:
Nothing ... should be understood as imposing a duty to bargain collectively regarding
such managerial decisions, which lie at the core of entrepreneurial control. Decisions
concerning the commitment of investment capital and the basic scope of the enterprise
are not in themselves primarily about conditions of employment....
FibreboardPaper Products v. NLRB, 379 U.S. 203, 223 (1964) (Stewart, J., concurring). See
also Julius G. Getman and Bertrand P. Pogrebin, Labor Relations: The Basic Processes,Law
and Practice 5 (Foundation, 1988) (observing that "the Act has from the beginning been
interpreted in such a way as to minimize interference with managerial authority and
entrepreneurial decision making").
158. Fibreboard,379 U.S. at 223; Getman and Pogrebin, Labor Relations at 5.
159. See notes 182-207 and accompanying text.
160. Nielsen III, 977 F.2d at 1170-71; Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 702 (Member Oviatt,
concurring). Codetermination is the theory that labor and management should have an equal
say in the direction of the business enterprise. For example, in Germany larger companies are
required to have a labor-management "works council" to discuss and shape the overall direction
of the enterprise. See Tracy H. Ferguson and John Gaal, Codetermination: A Fad or a Future
in America?, 10 Empl. Rel. L. J. 176, 176-80 (1984).
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NationalMaintenance Corp. v. NLRB, 161 in which the Supreme Court
stated that Congress did not expect or require management to make
the union an equal partner in the business.162 While the Supreme
Court has rejected codetermination, this fact is not relevant to
financial information disclosure in most cases, because few
information requests would lead to impermissible union knowledge or
control of the company.6 3 When matters fundamental to functioning
of the business are at issue, however, the concerns raised by First
National Maintenance are similar to those raised in the preceding
paragraph and will be dealt with in Part V.
2. The NLRB
In contrast to the Seventh Circuit and Member Oviatt, the
NLRB majority did not lay out a theoretical justification for its
decision. Rather, it simply asserted that precedent commanded
disclosure only if an employer claimed an inability to pay. 164 The
nature of the union's request may have fueled an NLRB concern of
overreaching into management prerogatives, 165 but the NLRB did not
explicitly rest its decision on this concern. Unlike the Seventh
Circuit's narrow conception of a plea of poverty, the NLRB's loosely
written definition of inability to pay left the NLRB considerable
flexibility to decide future cases on a case-by-case basis.166

As discussed above, 67 Member Oviatt, who concurred in the
NLRB's judgment,658 limited disclosure in part because of fears of
codetermination similar to those of the Seventh Circuit. He also
believed that the indeterminacy and complexity of financial
161. 452 U.S. 666 (1981).
162. Id. at 676. For a contrary view, see Shedlin, 41 Ohio St. L. J. at 453-56 (cited in note
7) (advocating that financial disclosure could be the catalyst for greater cooperation).
163. In any case, FirstNational Maintenance is inapplicable to this situation, because it
dealt with a decision to close a plant, a nonmandatory subject of bargaining. First National
Maintenance, 452 U.S. at 676-77. The Court found the subject nonmandatory because the
decision to move a plant concerns the scope and direction of the business and does not turn on
labor considerations. Id. Neither the employer nor the union has an obligation to bargain over
nonmandatory subjects. NLRB v. Wooster Division of Borg-Warner Corp., 356 U.S. 342, 349
(1958). Where the discussion focuses on issues such as wages and benefits, as in Nielsen, the
NLRA requires good faith bargaining. Id.
164. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 699-701.
165. Following a statement by the union's chief negotiator that the company had "too many
chiefs and not enough Indians," the union sought information concerning Nielsen's management
structure. Id. at 698. See note 98 for a list of union demands. See also notes 201-05 and
accompanying text.
166. See also note 145.
167. See notes 160-63 and accompanying text.
168. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 701-03.
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information would slow the bargaining process without yielding
benefits to either party. 169 As Chairman Stephens noted in his
dissent, this view, taken to its logical conclusion, would permit the
NLRB to deny disclosure in all situations.170
IV. GOOD FAITH BARGAINING AND THE NIELSEN DECISIONS

Because the genesis of a financial information disclosure requirement is the statutory command of good faith bargaining, it is
important to examine the Nielsen decisions' notion of good faith.
Under the opinions, an employer that unambiguously makes an inability-to-pay claim and fails to substantiate it will be held in violation of the Act for not bargaining in good faith, regardless of any honest desire to reach agreement. On the other hand, an employer that
avoids using the magic words signaling a plea of poverty will be held
to have met the good faith requirement and not be required to disclose
information, even if the employer has no desire for agreement and is
avoiding disclosure for purely strategic reasons.
It is difficult to characterize this good faith standard as objective or subjective. Employers are judged solely on the statements
they make as evidence of their intent, which seems to be the essence
of a subjective, case-by-case, standard. However, only certain trigger
phrases 171 raise the obligation to disclose, making the standard seem
objectiveY72 Paradoxically, then, the Nielsen decisions appear to
endorse a case-by-case objective good faith standard. Other federal
courts have also adopted this standard and looked at particular
statements without fully evaluating their context. 173
Problematically, this standard allows a well-counseled
employer to escape disclosure by avoiding magic words such as
"poverty" or "inability to pay," yet still convey to the union that failure
169. Id. at 701-02.
170. Id. at 707 n.10 (Chairman Stephens, dissenting).
171. The Seventh Circuit's test is far more rigid than then NLRB's on this point. See notes
127-29 and accompanying text, with special attention to the quoted language in note 129.
172. The NLRB could adopt another objective standard based on industry practice, under
which the NLRB would survey various industries to determine if employers generally disclose
the requested information to unions. No reported case has adopted this position. There are
several apparent problems with the idea. It is unclear whether all industries would be guided
by the same rule or by different rules depending on the type of business enterprise involved. A
more serious problem is that an industry-practice standard would negate any factors particular
to a specific bargaining situation. Finally, such a standard would permit employers to keep
information secret by allowing employers to set the level of disclosure through their own practices.
173. See note 20.
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The NLRB,

however, reserved the right to judge the particular facts and circumstances of each case. 175 This approach allows the NLRB to give the
appearance of employing the Seventh Circuit's quasi-objective
standard, while actually judging the subjective intentions of the
parties in each case. Although this approach avoids the problem of
allowing trigger phrases to dictate results, it does not give employers
or unions real guidance to determine when nondisclosure will violate
the good faith bargaining requirement.
Decisions immediately preceding and following Nielsen demonstrate the difficulties with the NLRB standard. Cases with facts
176
almost indistinguishable from Nielsen have come out both ways.
Although the NLRB attempted to find distinctions in some of these
cases, 177 a management lawyer found these attempts unconvincing
and concluded that NLRB and court decisions are inconsistent and
have provided employers with little guidance.78 In Circuit-Wise
Inc.y 9 a case decided after Nielsen, the NLRB required financial
information disclosure on facts similar to those in Nielsen. In CircuitWise, the union requested balance sheets and fund flow statements to
evaluate a management proposal for a profit-based retirement plan.80
Management denied the request and the union filed a charge with the
NLRB. Without mentioning Nielsen, the NLRB required disclosure,
8
stating that the information was relevant to the union.1 '
In summary, cases before and after Nielsen, as well as the
NLRB's opinion in Nielsen, leave employers and unions with little
sense of where the NLRB will go next. The Seventh Circuit adopted
clear substantiation and relevance standards that leave all control in
174. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 706 (Chairman Stephens, dissenting); Hexter, 8 Labor Law.
at 843-44, 846-47 (cited in note 18). The Board itself warned against such facile analysis in
Atlanta Hilton & Tower, 271 N.L.R.B. 1600, 1602 (1984) (stating. "Inability to pay need not be
expressed with any particular magic words").
175. See notes 127-29 and accompanying text.
176. Cases which have come out against disclosure include United Paperworkers,981 F.2d
at 865-66; United Steelworkers, 983 F.2d at 243-45; Beverly CaliforniaCorp., 310 N.L.R.B. 222,
226-27 (1993) (NLRB's decision not to require disclosure was upheld in Torrington Extend-ACareAss'n v. NLRB, 17 F.3d 580, 588-89 (2d Cir. 1994)); and Burrus Transfer,307 N.L.R.B. 226,
227-28 (1992). In Nielsen II, the Board approved the following cases that require disclosure:
Clemson Bros., 290 N.L.R.B. 944, 944-45 (1988); S-B Manufacturing Co., 270 N.L.R.B. 485, 491
(1984); Unoco Apparel, Inc., 208 N.L.R.B. 601 (1974); and Facet Enterprises, 290 N.L.R.B. 152
(1988).
177. See Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 700 n. 9 (distinguishing similar cases).
178. Carron and Noecker, 8 Labor Law. at 819 (cited in note 18).
179. 306 N.L.R.B. 766 (1992).
180. Id. at 767-68.
181. Id. at 768. Specifically, the Board stated that "good-faith bargaining encompasses a
party's right to relevant information.... ." Id.
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the hands of the employer. These standards reflect the court's view
that financial information is generally within management's prerogative and that the full force of economic weapons should decide the
outcome of negotiations. Only when expressly commanded by the
narrowest reading of Truitt will the Seventh Circuit require
disclosure. The NLRB, under the sway of the Seventh Circuit, has
agreed with this substantiation standard, but refuses to commit itself
to a theory that will make its decisions predictable.
Even more troubling than the lack of predictability, however,
is the Nielsen decisions' failure to articulate a vision of financial information disclosure consonant with the statutory and Supreme Court
requirements of good-faith bargaining. An interpretive scheme is
needed that permits disclosure of financial information when it furthers collective bargaining yet does not compromise fundamental and
legitimate management interests; in other words, a solution that
preserves the tension inherent in the Act.
V. RECONSTRUCTING FINANCIAL INFORMATION DISCLOSURE
The first step toward a better understanding of financial disclosure is to remember the Supreme Court's statements in Truitt and
DetroitEdison. In both cases, the Court was clear that the particular
facts of each case, especially as regards overall good faith, should be of
paramount importance.182
Moreover, the NLRA, its legislative
history, and Truitt command that any solution to information
disclosure must retain the tension between requiring labor and management to bargain seriously, while not forcing either to sacrifice its
prerogatives. 8 3 Additionally, and this is where Truitt is at its weakest, the Court should create solid guidelines for labor and management relations so that these matters need not continually go before
the NLRB.
Unfortunately, the Seventh Circuit's reasoning in Nielsen does
not embody these principles. Instead, fears of codetermination and a
desire for a clear rule produce a deck stacked against the union. The
NLRB appeared to adopt much of the Seventh Circuit's reasoning,
while leaving itself several means to extricate itself when needed.
Neither approach is satisfactory. What is needed is a way of thinking
about financial information disclosure that retains the subjective good

182. See notes 53, 60, 88-93, and accompanying text.
183. See Parts II and IV.
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faith elements endorsed by the Supreme Court, preserves the
mandated tension in the Act, and gives management and unions an
idea of what to expect if the issues come before the NLRB. Following
is a proposal that should achieve these goals.
Because the Supreme Court has held that topics within
1
management prerogative are not proper subject of bargaining, 8
financial information that falls within management's sphere should
not have to be disclosed. The first question, therefore, is to what
extent the control over financial information is within a management
prerogative. The answer depends on the interrelation of two factors:
first, the breadth of management prerogatives; and second, the
impact a particular information request has by cutting into the
prerogatives as defined. An abstract definition of management
prerogatives has little value in making these determinations, so it
may be best to think in terms of concrete examples. Financial
information can be broken into two broad categories. The first is
forward-looking information, such as profitability and dividend
projections. The second is data regarding past events, such as profitloss statements, sales records, market share information, and
arrearages, among many others.
The first group seems clearly to be within management prerogative. While it is easy to see how forward-looking information
would "substantiate" a company's claim of economic difficulty, or be
relevant to a union in its decision regarding how hard to press a particular demand, predictions of future performance are subjective,
produced solely by management, usually without an intent to affect
labor-management relations directly, 185 and are generally not publicly
disclosed. 86
Unless the company has previously disclosed the
information to a public source outside the company, a refusal to disclose this information should not result in a violation of the requirement to bargain in good faith.
184. See Fibreboard Corp., 379 U.S. at 223 (Stewart, J. concurring); notes 157-58 and
accompanying text.

185. While labor costs may have some effect on future profitability or other projections,
these costs are not generally the focus of, or the reason for, the projections. This secondary
effect should not force disclosure. See notes 157-63 (especially note 163) and accompanying text.
186. Courts generally have not required companies to disclose such forward-looking information under federal securities laws. See generally Bruce A. Hiler, The SEC and the Courts'
Approach to Disclosure of EarningsProjections,Asset Appraisals, and Other Soft Information"
Old Problems,Changing Views, 46 Md. L. Rev. 1114 (1987). Exceptions to this rule include the
following cases: when disclosure of such information is necessary to avoid investor misunderstanding of a company statement (whether at the time of the statement or at some later date if
changing circumstances create possible confusion); or if the information would amount to a
"material" qualification of a company statement. Id. at 1127-28.
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The second category, past information, is capable of additional
subdivision. Federal securities laws and other federal and state regulatory schemes require disclosure of much of this information.87
Other information is often voluntarily disclosed through press releases or other means. Since the union could access this information
by buying a share of stock, poring through submitted documents, or
attending press conferences, the NLRB and courts should not allow a
company to claim management prerogatives when the union asks for
the same information during bargaining. 18 8 Especially when obtaining
the information proves difficult for the union, the failure to disclose
such information would show a lack of good faith bargaining and con189
stitute a violation of the statute.
A second type of past information is that which the employer
has chosen not to disclose publicly. It is this information that poses
the most difficulty. Both the NLRA and Supreme Court precedent
emphasize the need to preserve the tension between bargaining requirements and freedom of contract while also considering subjective
good faith. The Seventh Circuit recognizes that the NLRB and courts
must also weigh management prerogatives and the need for certainty
in the law governing good faith.
A proper analysis begins where the Court did in Truitt with a
belief that bargaining is most fruitful when all information is on the
table. 190 Absent countervailing pressures, a proper interpretation of
good-faith bargaining would permit disclosure of financial information
sought by the union. The doctrines of substantiation and relevancy,
both adopted in Truitt, 91 are helpful here. When a company makes a
claim that economic conditions foreclose a wage increase, or require a
concession, the company should be required to substantiate that claim
with financial information. The Nielsen decisions recognize this
avenue to disclosure.92 The substantiation standard should continue

187. For an overview of which companies must disclose, and what they must disclose, see
Thomas Lee Hazen, The Law of SecuritiesRegulation 31-33, 58-61, 232-40 (West, 1984).
188. Professor Robert Covington first suggested this approach to the Author. See Robert
Covington, Shall We Dance-Or Must We: Bargaining Over the Transfer of Work 42-43
(unpublished manuscript on file with the Author). This proposal would theoretically result in
greater disclosure by publicly traded corporations than by privately held entities. To the extent
this is so, it results from the mandate in other federal laws and not from this proposal. Whether
it is fairer to treat companies differently because of their size and corporate structure is beyond
the scope of this Note.
189. If the information is easily obtainable through some public means, the NLRB or court
could simply require the union to obtain it on its own.
190. See notes 47-51 and accompanying text.
191. See notes 41-51, 62-64 and accompanying text.
192. See notes 107-34 and accompanying text.
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to provide unions with an avenue to gain financial information. The
NLRB should avoid the "magic word" implications of the substantiation standard in Nielsen 9' and look carefully at the intentions and
interests behind the statements.
Even without a claim of inability to pay, however, company
statements may have relevance to the union's decision-making process. As the Truitt Court stated, relevancy is an appropriate basis for
information disclosure.194 The problem is, however, that all information is arguably relevant to the union in its role as bargainer. A pure
relevance standard would not maintain any balance between union
and management interests. There are several ways that the concept
of relevancy can be narrowed. The first, discussed above, is that nonpublic, forward-looking information could be denied. This information
is the most sensitive to the company because it includes the forecasts
desired by competitors and investors.
Beyond this fundamental protection, cases throughout the
years have demonstrated several ways that disclosure can be structured to preserve legitimate management concerns. First, management should be able to shape the form of disclosure to minimize costs
and possible use of information by competitors. The NLRB and courts
could also require the union to bear some of the costs of preparing the
data. 195 Second, management should be able to raise legitimate confidentiality concerns. 96 Trade secrets and patents, for instance,
should not be subject to disclosure, except under carefully circumscribed conditions. 197 Third, evidence of bad faith in the union's
request should be grounds for limited disclosure, or in an extreme

193. See note 174 and accompanying text.
194. See notes 62-64 and accompanying text.
195. See Safeway Stores Inc., 252 N.L.R.B. at 1324 (stating that if the production of infor-

mation will involve substantial costs, the parties must then bargain as to who should bear such
costs); GeneralMotors Corp., 243 N.L.R.B. at 186 (same); and Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers
Local Union No. 6-418 v. NLRB, 711 F.2d 348, 363 (D.C. Cir. 1983) (stating that the cost of the
union's request may in certain circumstances relieve the employer from the obligation to pro-

vide some or all of the information to the union). Although the company may request that the
union bear some of the cost, such concerns do not justify a categorical refusal to disclose. Oil,
Chemical and Atomic Workers, 711 F.2d at 363. See also note 12.
196. Detroit Edison,440 U.S. at 316-20. See also FawcettPrintingCorp., 201 N.L.R.B. 964,
974 (1973), in which the NLRB permitted management to withhold certain information based on
fears that if released, the information would damage business prospects. In many ways, this
case is a model; the NLRB did not compel release of most of the information the company

deemed confidential, but still allowed the union to obtain enough information to fulfill its statutory role as bargaining agent. Id. See also note 6.
197. Oil, Chemical and Atomic Workers, 711 F.2d at 362. This exception, too, should not

justify the withholding of all information. Id.
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case, nondisclosure. 19 8 Similarly, management bad faith in other
negotiation matters should weigh in favor of disclosure. 199
To these safeguards, three additional requirements should be
imposed. First, the union should have the burden of proving that the
information requested is relevant.200 This restriction would prevent
broad, discovery-type requests. Second, this burden must be met for
each type of financial information requested. These first two
requirements would serve two purposes. First, they would blunt the
possibility that the union would use disclosure requests as a means of
harassment. Second, it would give courts the ability to separate
meritorious requests from spurious ones.
The third additional requirement is that judges and NLRB
members should consider the overall nature of the union's request for
information to determine if a union's purpose in asking for the information is in good faith. If it develops that the union is using the
request to harass the employer, or to question management's
decisions on issues properly within management control, courts and
the NLRB should either deny or limit the union request.
These relevancy and substantiation standards reflect a view of
good faith that is largely objective, but with a serious attempt to inquire into the parties' motives. They are objective because once the
union establishes the relevancy of a particular piece of information or
the employer makes a claim requiring substantiation, failure to sup198. For instance, a refusal to bargain seriously has been held to justify nondisclosure.
NLRB v. GoodyearAmerica Corp., 497 F.2d 747, 752 (6th Cir. 1974). Additionally, legitimate
employer fears that a union desires the information to harass nonunion employees has excused
the need for disclosure, so long as the company has acted in good faith. See AS. Abell, 624 F.2d
at 512-13; Sign and PictorialUnion Local 1175 v. NLRB, 419 F.2d 726, 738 (D.C. Cir. 1969).
199. For example, it is well-established that management conduct to discredit the union
violates the NLRA's good faith requirement. NLRB v. Katz, 369 U.S. 736, 747 (1962). In Katz,
management offered union negotiators a package that included substantially less paid sick leave
and lower wages than it unilaterally offered the workers later. Id. at 744-45. The Supreme
Court held that this action was calculated to undermine employee faith in the union, a prohibited action under the NLRA. Id. at 747 (noting that "[u]nilateral action by an employer ...will
often disclose an unwillingness to agree with the union).
It is possible to imagine a similar dynamic in the financial information disclosure arena. In
a given case, management may illegitimately deny information to the union to demonstrate to
the rank and file members that the union is ineffective. Nielsen's facts hint at this possibility;
management refused to share information with the union after a 40-year bargaining relationship. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 697. Especially when there is a long history of bargaining, and
the union's behavior gives no indication of bad faith, the NLRB and courts should scrutinize
management's refusal for the possibility that it is the opening salvo in a campaign to discredit
the union. If such behavior is found, disclosure would be appropriate.
200. The Third Circuit did, at one time, adopt this view to financial information disclosure.
Curtiss-WrightCorp., 347 F.2d at 69 (stating that "as to other requested data, however, such as
employer profits and production figures, a union must, by reference to the circumstances of the
case, as an initial matter, demonstrate more precisely the relevance of the data it desires').
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ply the information leaves the company in violation of the Act. The
safeguards outlined above, however, allow the employer to offer
several good faith defenses to such claims and permit a judge or
NLRB member to inquire into the union's motive and forestall
disclosure if the union lacks good faith.
Applying these principles to the facts of Nielsen, the first issue
to be addressed is whether any of the information is forward-looking
and should not be disclosed in any circumstance. A part of request
one, which asked for projected balance sheets, falls into this
category. 2 1 Thus, these requests should be denied unless the
information has been publicly distributed. 2 2 Next, the Board would
need to determine if the company had released any of the requested
information to federal securities regulators or the public. Assuming
that the information was not already disclosed, the NLRB should next
determine if the company made statements that require
substantiation. The NLRB decided this question in Nielsen and found
the employer's statements had not risen to that level.203 As discussed
above, there is much to criticize in this finding, primarily because,
from the union's perspective, the employer statements can easily be
24
read to require substantiation.
Assuming the NLRB was correct on substantiation, the next
issue is relevancy. As a preliminary matter, the union would not have
met the burden advanced in this section requiring it to justify each
request. Assuming such justifications were made, items four, five,
and six fail the tests laid out above. Information requested on expense reports, automobile leasing, and composition of supervisory
personnel fall into the category of matters which are only tangentially
related to collective bargaining, but are central to management decision making. Testimony by the union negotiator confirms this hypothesis, for he stated that the information was requested because the
20 5
union believed that the company employed too many managers.
Items one, two, and three, which are classic financial information disclosure issues, must be considered individually. In each case,
the union must make a showing that the particular piece of informa201. See note 98 for the union's information request.
202. Filing with a bank to obtain financing should not in itself lead to disclosure because
the information revealed in these applications are for limited distribution by the company and
often include the type of projections that would be especially valuable to competitors.
203. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 700-01.
204. See notes 130-31, 140-42 and accompanying text.
205. Nielsen II, 305 N.L.R.B. at 698. Item seven, which asked for information regarding
laid-off employees, is not a financial information disclosure issue, and as such is beyond the
scope of this Note.
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tion is relevant to the bargaining process. All three appear facially
relevant. Depending upon the nature of the union's request, or its
general negotiating tenor, the NLRB may determine that the request
was designed to harass the employer or otherwise made without good
faith. The company could also raise defenses of confidentiality or
trade secret. Finally, the company could seek to limit the particular
information disclosed based upon cost or convenience.
Notwithstanding Nielsen's possible defenses, it appears that Nielsen
should have been required to disclose the information requested in
items one, two, and three, save for the forward-looking information in
item one.
Those who suspect that unions' only motive is control over the
enterprise will not support the plan outlined above because the relevancy and substantiation standards will permit significant amounts
of financial information to be released. The advantages of the
proposal, however, are many. If adopted, the suggestion would lead to
more predictable results, by establising a general presumption in
favor of disclosure of past information. It would also vindicate the
primary command of the statute by endorsing good faith bargaining
and requiring disclosure when it would further the chances of
agreement, 2°8
while
preserving
legitimate
management
prerogatives. 207 In so doing, this proposal reflects the balance struck

in the passage of the NLRA and preserves the tension found in the
legislative history and Supreme Court cases.
VI. CONCLUSION

For nearly sixty years, the NLRB and courts have struggled
with the issue of when the NLRA's good faith provision requires a
company to disclose financial information to unions. Depending upon
their reading of the Act or their particular ideology, judges have
limited or expanded union access to company records. The recent
trend, as found in a troika of recent opinions involving the Nielsen
Lithographing Company, is to require disclosure in only the
narrowest of circumstances.
Courts have differed widely on this question because, at its
root, the NLRA represents a compromise between those who would
mandate government-imposed
equality between labor and
206. See notes 1, 73-79 (arguing that the NLRA and Supreme Court precedent advocate
agreements through collective bargaining).
207. See notes 157-63 and accompanying text.
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management and those who would leave labor-management relations
to the free market. To achieve the compromise, Congress often
employed vague and conflicting language. For instance, the NLRA
requires that labor and management bargain collectively in good
faith, but also forbids the NLRB or courts from invading the
substance of negotiations. While the statutory compromises may
appear flawed at first, they actually reflect a careful balance of the
legitimate perspectives of labor and management.
The fundamental flaw of the Nielsen decisions is that instead
of recognizing this tension in the Act, they have attempted to resolve
it by emphasizing employer freedom to retain control over the
company. The resulting scheme, which would force disclosure only if
the owner specifically claims an inability to pay a wage or benefit
demand, permits employers to control the flow of financial
information and often leaves unions without information they need to
represent their membership effectively.
The NLRB and courts should revisit the issue of financial
information disclosure. Instead of resolving the tension found in the
Act, they should attempt to preserve the tension and devise a regime
that accounts for both labor and management interests when
interpreting the Act's good faith requirement. This Note proposes
that unions be able to obtain information not only when the company
claims an inability to pay, but also when the information is relevant
to the union in its role as collective bargaining agent. When
management can show that such information is central to its control
of the enterprise, however, it should be able to limit or refuse
disclosure. Additionally, management should be able to shape
disclosure to meet confidentiality or cost concerns. Finally, the Note
proposes that the NLRB and courts carefully review the union request
and management response for indications of a lack of good faith.
If adopted, this proposal would support the balance achieved
by the NLRA by promoting good faith bargaining, while preserving
the legitimate interests of both labor and management.
Brent Robbins*
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